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SENTENCE CREDITING FOR THE STATE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT-
A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years several federal courts have encountered the question
whether the state criminal defendant charged with a bailable offense and
unable to make bail is constitutionally entitled to have his pretrial jail
time credited against the sentence which he incurs upon conviction. This
small but growing number of decisions tends to uphold the tight to and
necessity for such sentence crediting.1 Such a right is recognized by statute
for federal defendants;2 the issue is thus one pressed only by state criminal
defendants. The United States Supreme Court has not as yet addressed
this precise issue.3
This note will examine a series of constitutional arguments which sup-
port a finding that states must allow sentence crediting.
II. SENTENCE CREDITING AND THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
A. Historical Perspective
Francis Bacon has said: "The Laws are like cobwebs; the small flies
are caught but the great break through." In Griffin v. Illinois' the Su-
pyeme Court began to use the equal protection clause to insure indigents
equality of treatment in the criminal process-seeking as it were to disen-
tangle these "small flies" from the criminal law's cobweb-like effects. In
ruling that indigent defendants must be furnished with a transcript on
appeal, the Court said that there could be no equality before the law if
the kind of trial a man received depended on the amount of money he
had. The "mere state of being without funds" could no longer be charac-
terized as "constitutionally an irrelevance."5 While Griffin pertained to the
1 McGinnis v. United States ex rel. Pollack, 452 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1971); United States
v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1971); White v. Gilligan, 351 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio
1972); Workman v. Cardwell, 338 F. Supp. 893, 898-901 (N.D. Ohio 1972), vacated in
part, 471 F.2d 909, 911 (6th Cit. 1972); Mott v. Dail, 337 F. Supp. 731 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
Cf. Wilson v. North Carolina, 438 F.2d 284 (4th Cit. 1971); Wright v. Maryland, 429
F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1970).
2 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970); see United States v. Jones, 393 F.2d 728 (6th Cir. 1968);
Stapf v. United States, 367 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cit. 1966).
3 But see Gaines v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006 (1971), discussed at text accompanying
notes 27 through 33 infra.
4 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
5 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1940). In Edwards, a California statute
making it a misdemeanor to bring a nonresident "indigent person" into the state was declared
invalid. The Court said that a man's property status could not be used by a state to limit
or qualify his rights, i.e., that indigence was constitutionally irrelevant. In Griffin the Court
moved beyond this negative action for indigents to more affirmative action.
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appeal segment of the criminal process, recent Supreme Court decisions
have extended its equal protection rationale to sentencing procedures.
Williams v. Illinois6 concerned an indigent defendant who was impris-
oned beyond the statutory maximum imposed for his offense because of
his inability to pay a fine and court costs. Relying heavily on the argu-
ment it had put forth in Griffin, the Supreme Court held that such incar-
ceration was violative of equal protection: "Once the state has defined the
outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy its penalogical interests
and policies, it may not then subject certain classes of convicted defendants
to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely by rea-
son of their indigency."7  To do so would be to determine the length of
an individual's maximum confinement not by a statutory standard, but
rather by a standard of wealth-an impermissible discrimination according
to the Court. As in Griffin the Court seemed to place an affirmative duty
upon the state. "At the minimum Williams means that in imposing fines
as punishment for criminal conditions more care must be taken to provide
for those whose lack of funds would otherwise automatically convert a
fine into a jail sentence.""
It soon became apparent that this necessity for "more care" was not
only incumbent upon the courts when indigency caused a defendant to
be, incarcerated for longer than the maximum term. Morris v. Schoon-
field,9 decided shortly after Williams, reached the issue of an indigent who
served not longer than the maximum, but longer than a man with an
ability to pay would have. In an opinion in which three justices concurred,
Mr. Justice White stated that:
The same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also inheres in jail-
ing an indigent for failure to make immediate payment of any fine, wheth-
er or not the fine is accompanied by a jail term and whether or not the
jail term of the indigent extends beyond the maximum term that may be
imposed on a person willing and able to pay a fine. In each case the
Constitution prohibits the state from imposing a fine as a sentence and
then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defen-
dant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay in full.o
In these cases the Court was concerned with what it saw as an arbitrary
extension of a man's sentence because he lacked economic means. For
though a state sets the outer limits of incarceration, it allows the trial
judge discretion in setting the boundaries in each case. Theoretically at
6399 U.s. 235 (1970).
7Id. at 241-42.
8Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970). The Supreme Court remanded this
sentence crediting case in light of its decision in Williams v. Illinois. In a concurring opinion
Justice White, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, explained what he felt
the Court required by the Williams decision.
9 399 U.S. 508 (1970).
1lid. at 509.
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least, the trial judge comes to his decision after consideration of the partic-
ular defendant, his crime, and the societal interests which need to be
served. Thus it is just as discriminatory to effect an extension of imprison-
ment beyond this court-imposed limit as it is to do so beyond a statutory
limit. In each situation the defendant is deprived of his liberty where
another with funds would not have been. It could always be argued,
of course, that where the extension is not beyond the maximum the accused
has no real grievance, since the trial court could have imposed the maxi-
mum sentence. The significant point, however, is that the court did not
do so; and for the state to take the court's shorter sentence and extend
it because of indigency is to discriminate on the basis of wealth. It is,
in effect, to punish poverty as if it were a crime.
The language in Morris was broad and far-reaching. In much the
same way that the Morris decision flowed from Williams so did Morris
in turn give rise to Tate v. Short," a case in which the Supreme Court
directly confronted the situation where in fact it is poverty that causes
a man to go to jail rather than simply prolonging his sentence. The
Morris decision condemned the practice of a state automatically converting
a fine into a jail term where the sentence consisted of a prison term and
a fine. In Tate the Court considered the constitutionality of a statutory
scheme substantially like the widely used "30 days or 30 dollars" type
of statute in which a defendant is obliged to pay a certain fine or to spend
a certain amount of time in jail "working off" the fine. The Court found
it a denial of equal protection to limit punishment to payment of a fine
if one is able to pay but to transform the fine into a jail term if one
cannot do so because of indigency. Such a choice is an illusion for the
man who has no access to funds and is in reality being imprisoned for
his poverty.2
B. Applying Equal Protection to Sentence Crediting
Against this background the question of a convicted defendant's right
to sentence crediting may be examined. It will be argued that such credit-
ing is a "logical extension"' 3 of the Supreme Court decisions dis-
cussed in the previous subsection of the note. In determining whether
this is so, it is first necessary to analyze briefly the equality test that the
Supreme Court used in constructing the equal protection model it put forth
in Griffin and its progeny. As the Court itself has recognized, "absolute
equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn and we often sustain
1401 U.S. 395 (1971).
12 In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 1000, 473 P.2d 999, 1006 (1970) (in which it was held
that requiring an indigent defendant to "work off" his fine in jail constituted an invidious
discrimination based on poverty in violation of equal protecton).
13 Workman v. Cardwell, 338 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1972), vacated in part, 471 F.2d
909, 911 (6th Cir. 1972).
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them."' 4  It has come to be recognized that there is a dual aspect to the
equal protection standard. The traditional test-by which the Court ex-
tends presumption of constitutionality to a state created classification and
only asks that there be some rational nexus between it and a legitimate
state end'--has tended to give way to a stricter test in cases involving
"suspect classifications" or cases touching upon "fundamental interests."
In these latter situations the Court has subjected the classification to strict
scrutiny, demanding not merely a legitimate state end, but rather a com-
pelling state interest. 16 The statute is not afforded a presumption of consti-
tutionality; instead, the burden is upon the state to establish that the dis-
tinctions it has drawn are necessary to further a compelling state purpose.
In Griffin and its progeny the Court clearly applied a stricter standard
than the rational basis test. These cases have involved, at one and the
same time, both classifications based upon wealth and denials of the per-
sonal liberty of the defendant. The former may be a "suspect classifica-
tion" in and of itself.17 Since both, as will be argued immediately below,
are present in the sentence crediting cases, it is unnecessary to rely upon
one or the other as determinative of these cases; it is enough to point
out that, since the same elements are present in the sentence crediting
cases as were present in the Griffin line of cases, the same test should be
applied. 8
Sentence crediting by its very nature involves a question of denial of
personal liberty; whether such crediting occurs will often determine the
length of the convicted defendant's jail term. Nor is it difficult to find
a classification based upon wealth in cases involving sentence crediting.
Each case involves a situation in which the defendant faced a "choice"
before trial: make bail or go to jail. There can be few, if any, cases
in which the defendant "chooses" the latter for any reason other than one
relating to his ability to meet the bail set in his case. Put briefly, a person
will not spend time in jail unless he has no other feasible alternative open
to him. Viewed in this light, the sentence crediting case does not give
rise to the difficult question, as yet unresolved by the courts, as to what,
exactly, constitutes indigency. 9 Any person seeking sentence crediting for
14 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 363 (1963) finding it a violation of equal protection
to deny an indigent defendant right to counsel on appeal.
15See e.g., Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Money v. Doud,
354 U.S. 457 (1957); Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954).
16See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969)(voting); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)(interstate travel). Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944)(racial- classification).
17See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 41 U.S.L.W. 4407, 4414
n.60 (1973); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
'
8 See Note, Equal Protection--Choice of Fine or Imprisonment is No Choice at All
for an Indigent Offender, 16 VILL. L REv. 754 (1971).
19 A good statement of the problem may be found in Kamisar and Choper. The Right
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a bailable offense has faced a classification based upon wealth, since a
person of unlimited means would, assumedly, under the same circumstances
secure his release by making bail.
The existence of both deprivation of personal liberty and classifications
based upon wealth in these sentence crediting cases should allay the fear,
expressed by some, of "an ideology of unrestrained egalitarianism. '20  For
example, the suggestion of Mr. Justice Harlan that if a fee could not be
imposed for appellate review then it also could not be required for admis-
sion to a state university has never, in fact, materialized.2' Such an argu-
ment ignores the dual bases of the Court's equal protection analysis in
the Griffin line of cases. One commentator has written:
The provision of applied justice is an essential function of the State even
under the most conservative political theory. It is of the essence of citi-
zenship that a person have access to the state's legal institutions. Without
this he is also without full citizenship .... We cannot conceive of a man
as truly a citizen if he is too poor to have access to the courts. We can,
however, conceive of him as truly a citizen if he is too poor to receive
[an education at a State Universityl. A state which . . . provides all its
citizens with applied justice is . . . only giving all men that which is the
most basic function of government, the provision of legal process. 22
The analogies between the Griffin line of cases and the sentence credit-
ing cases are compelling. The situation in which an accused indigent to-
day finds himself regarding his right to sentence crediting is essentially
the same as that which the pre-Griffin indigent faced in regard to his right
to appellate review.2 1 It would appear that there is "no substantive differ-
ence between a prisoner who is forced to remain in jail after the comple-
tion of his sentence because of his inability to pay a fine and an indigent
defendant who must remain in jail prior to his trial because of his inability
to post bond. '24  The defendant who cannot make bail and who, after
conviction, is denied sentence crediting, serves, in effect, a longer term
than he would have had he been released on bail prior to trial.
In substance, it compels an indigent prisoner to be confined for a period
longer than one who is released on bail between verdict or plea and com-
mitment. The Equal Protection Clause requires that all time spent in any
to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L.
Rnv. 1, 22-23 (1963).
20 Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 35 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22 Willcox, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q.
1, 16 (1957). Thus far the Supreme Court has not held higher education to be a fundamental
right owed all citizens by the state; indeed, the Court has held that grade-school education
is not a fundamental right. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 41 U.S.L.W.
4407 (1973).
23 Sachs, Indigent Court Costs and Bail: Charge Them to Equal Protection, 27 ID. L.
REV. 154 (1967).
2 4 White v. Gilligan, 351 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
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jail prior to trial and commitment by prisoners who are unable to make
bail because of indigency must be credited to his sentence. The Four-
teenth Amendment does not conscience discretion in such matters.25
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed itself to this issue
directly, one case in particular should be noted for its implicit indication
of the Court's direction. In United States v. Gaines26 the defendant was
seeking credit on a federal sentence for almost two years spent in state
custody because he was unable to meet bail. Gaines had been convicted
of a federal narcotics violation and was released on bail pending sentenc-
ing. While on bail he was arrested by the New York state authorities,
charged with robbery and murder, and held without bail. Pursuant to
a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, Gaines appeared before the fed-
eral court, which sentenced him to two years on the narcotics charge. Then
he was returned to state custody for prosecution of the murder and robbery
charges. Although bail was then set at $7500, Gaines was unable to meet
this and remained in jail. The state charges were dropped when new
evidence led to the arrest and indictment of several other persons. Gaines
was then turned over to federal custody to, begin his two year sentence.
At this time he petitioned for credit for the time spent in state custody
after bail had been set; but the district court denied his motion and the
circuit court affirmed."7 The Supreme Court vacated this judgment and
remanded the case for "reconsideration in light of the position asserted
by the Solicitor General. ' 2 8 On remand, the Second Circuit stated:
After such reconsideration, we are now of the view that Gaines should be
credited with the time spent in custody after the state court had set bail.
Gaines was unable to enter into federal custody after bail was set in De-
cember 1969 solely because he lacked sufficient funds to post bond in the
state court which had him in custody. The Supreme Court's decisions in
Tate v. Short... and Williams v. Illinois... indicate that a man should
not be kept imprisoned solely because of his lack of wealth. If Gaines
had had the money to post the state bond in December 1969 and had then
entered federal custody, he would now be eligible for his conditional re-
lease. Gaines' lack of wealth has resulted in his having to serve a sentence
that a richer man would not have had to serve, an impermissible discrimi-
nation according to Tate and Williams. Accordingly, Gaines ought to be
credited with the time spent in state custody after bail was set.29
Since Gaines concerned a federal prisoner, the Second Circuit's decision
upon remand is somewhat clouded by the fact that such prisoners have
25 Workman v. Cardwell, 338 F. Supp. 893, 901 (N.D. Ohio 1972), vacated in part,
471 F.2d 909, 911 (6th Cir. 1972)(emphasis in the original).
26449 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1971).
27 United States v. Gaines, 436 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1971).
28 Gaines v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006 (1971).
29 United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143, 144 (2d Cir. 1971).
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a statutory right to sentence crediting.30 That is, an attempt might be
made to distinguish Gaines from a case involving a state prisoner in a
jurisdiction having no statutory right to sentence crediting. It is clear,
however, from the language quoted immediately above, that the Second
Circuit grounded its decision in the second Gaines opinion upon constitu-
tional considerations flowing from the Tate and Williams line of cases,
not upon the federal statutory right to sentence crediting. Indeed, the
Second Circuit had held in its first Gaines decision that the federal statutory
right to sentence crediting does not reach the case in which a federal pris-
oner is confined before trial by the state.
31
The Second Circuit did not pull its ratio decidendi in Gaines from
thin air; the memorandum filed by the Solicitor General to which the Court
referred in its brief order remanding the case to the Second Circuit,
32
expressly de-emphasized the statutory argument and relied heavily upon
the Tate and Williams line of cases. The Solicitor General argued:
Had [Nelson331 been able to post the bond, he would have been surren-
dered by the state authorities and would have completed service of all but
a few months of his three-year federal sentence by January 20, 1970, the
date of the district court's dismissal of the habeas writ; he would have
been eligible for conditional good-time release even prior to that date.
At all events, Nelson would have completed service of the full term of his
sentence prior to the court of appeals' judgment herein .... To construe
[18 U.S.C. § 35681 to deny Nelson relief under these circumstances
would be inconsistent with the spirit of numerous decisions of this Court
requiring that justice be applied to all persons equally and not on the
basis of ability to pay. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241; cf. Rin-
aldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305; Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277;
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477;
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335; Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438; Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708; Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214; Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12. Section 3568 is in our view not so inflexible in its
provisions as to be incompatible with an interpretation that would give
Nelson the relief he seeks.
Substantially the same considerations apply in [Gaines v. United
States]. 34
30 See note 2 supra.
31 United States v. Gaines, 436 F.2d 1069, 1070 (2d Cir. 1971). The court said, "We
are sympathetic to Gaines' plight, but we see no legal basis to justify relief . . . [18 U.S.C.
§3568] is unambiguous in not allowing credit for an unrelated offense."
32 Gaines v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006 (1971).
33 Nelson v. United States, 434 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1970), was a companion case to
Gaines on writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court. The facts of the two cases were
similar, and the Court remanded both in light of the Solicitor General's memorandum, see
402 U.S. 1006 (1971). The Eighth Circuit, unlike the Second, did not reach the issues
on remand, but remanded in turn to the district court, see Application of Nelson, 445 F.2d
631 (8th Cir. 1971).
3 Memorandum for the United States on Petition for Writs of Certiorari, at 14-15, Nelson
v. United States and Gaines v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
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It is difficult if not impossible to limit the rationale of the Solicitor
General and the Second Circuit to cases involving federal prisoners. Wil-
liams, Douglas, Gideon and Griffin all concerned state criminal processes,
and it would appear more difficult to apply the holdings in these cases
to federal prisoners, as the Solicitor General and the Second Circuit have
done, than to apply them to the case of the state prisoner. It is submitted
here, therefore, that the Gaines case is strong authority, absent an actual
Supreme Court decision on this precise issue, for the proposition that sen-
tence crediting is constitutionally required of the states .as well as the fed-
eral government.35
III. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
Constitutional claims for sentence crediting have, in large part, been
founded upon the equal protection clause. As indicated by the discussion
immediately above, the case law has recently made substantial progress
in developing the contours of these equal protection claims. There are,
however, other constitutional grounds upon which a claim for sentence
crediting can be based. Although these additional grounds have not been
the subject of substantial judicial discussion, they are important to an un-
derstanding of the many considerations underlying claims for sentence
crediting. This section will, therefore, briefly catalogue other constitution-
al arguments which support demands for sentence crediting.
35 It is necessary at this point to note a recent decision of the Supreme Court. McGinnis
v. Royster, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973), upheld a New York statute which denied good-time
credit (i.e., reduction of duration of imprisonment for good behavior while imprisoned) with
respect to presentence time spent in county jails by persons unable to make bail. The New
York statute permitted such good-time credit in computing the prisoner's statutory release
date, but denied it in computing the prisoner's minimum parole date. Royster challenged
the scheme under the equal protection clause, asserting that it unconstitutionally discriminated
against him because of his indigency. The Court rejected this argument:
As the statute and regulations contemplate state evaluation of an inmate's progress
towards rehabilitation, in awarding good time, it is reasonable not to award such time
for pretrial detention in a county jail where no systematic rehabilitative programs exist
and where the prisoner's conduct and performance are not even observed and evaluated
by the responsible state officials. 35 L.Ed.2d at 290.
Justices Douglas and Marshall dissented, arguing that good-time crediting is in reality
a disciplinary tool rather than a rehabilitative one, i.e., that "[the 'good time' deduction
is not based on progress toward rehabilitation but is an inducement to inhibit bad conduct."
35 L.Ed.2d at 293. The dissenters acknowledged, however, that if the assumption of the
majority is made, their result is correct: "If 'good time' were related to rehabilitative progress,
I would agree that the law passes muster under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 35 L.Ed.2d at 295.
The facts of McGinnis, relating as they do to good-time crediting and therefore to the
rehabilitative process, make the decision a very narrow one and inapplicable to the question
of the right of prisoners to sentence crediting for the time they spend in jail before conviction
duo to their inability to make bail. Prisoners seeking sentence crediting ask not to have
their sentences reduced as a discretionary matter depending upon the authorities' judgment
of their progress in rehabilitation, but rather demand that their presentence incarceration time,
which occurred solely because of their indigency, be applied against their post-sentence incar-
ceration time.
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A. Eighth Amendment Excessive Bail
Another constitutional ground for requiring states to engage in sen-
tence crediting is the eighth amendment provision: "Excessive bail shall
not be required...." The Supreme Court has never decided the issue
whether bail is excessive per se if a defendant is unable to meet it. But
it has said that when bail is set at an amount which is reasonable, then
it is not excessiveY6 What then is a reasonable amount? It is, an amount,
according to the Court, that assures the defendant's presence at trial. The
Court seems to have come full circle for this in effect is the most widely
accepted definition of bail-a device to assure an accused's appearance at
his trialYs In any case bail should not, and cannot, be used as a device
for keeping defendants in jail. Yet this is the effelct it has when a certain
class of persons-indigents-are required to make bail in a system based
only on monetary considerations. "The practice of requiring a certain class
of people to post money bail not only assures that they will be present
at trial, it also ensures that they will remain in pretrial custody (jail) pend-
ing their trial." 9  To avoid such a result, then, the proscription of the
eighth amendment must be read in conjunction with the guarantees of
the fourteenth amendment:
These words should be given an interpretation consistent with Griffin and
forbid any financial discrimination against the accused. This interpreta-
tion focuses on "the fundamental interest with which the amendment is
concerned: The right not to be punished before conviction and the right
not to be prejudiced in preparing for trial.40
The court's application of equal protection to the area of bail is not
without support. In dictum set forth in Bandy v. United States Mr. Justice
Douglas argued that:
We have held that an indigent defendant is denied equal protection of the
laws if he is denied an appeal on equal terms with other defendants, sole-
ly because of his indigence. Can an indigent be denied freedom, where a
wealthy man would not, because he does not happen to have enough prop-
erty to pledge for his freedom? 41
Several months later when the same case was again presented to him,
Mr. Justice Douglas reaffirmed his position. 2 Although the Court has
36 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
37id.
38 Foote, Studies on Bail 3 (1966).
39Workman v. Cardwell, 338 F. Supp. 893, 899 (N.D. Ohio 1972), vacated in part,
471 F.2d 909, 911 (6th Cir. 1972).
401d. (quoting Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REV.
960, 1181 (1965) ).
41 81 S. Ct. 197-98 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1960).
42Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 11, 12-13 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1961):
It would be unconstitutional to fix excessive bail to assure that a defendant will not
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never adopted Mr. Justice Douglas' view, it did decide the threshhold ques-
tion of the impact of excessive bail on pretrial custody time in Yates v.
United States.43 Yates has been interpreted as holding that where pretrial
imprisonment results from the imposition of "excessive bail" a defendant
is constitutionally entitled to sentence credit.44 Again, excessive bail was
defined to be an amount higher than was reasonably required to secure
the presence of the accused.
The eighth amendment's guarantee against excessive bail when coupled
with the fourteenth amendment's guarantees against financial discrimina-
tion as enunciated in Griffin thus constitutes another ground for requiring
sentence crediting.
B. Sixth Amendment Right to Trial
In addition to the contentions based on the fourteenth and the eighth
amendments, two other issues not discussed above may be raised by a de-
mand for sentence credit. The first concerns the sixth amendment right
to trial. Those defendants who plead guilty can immediately begin to
serve their sentence. Those on the other hand who insist on asserting
their right to trial face--in the absence of bail-the prospect of serving
many months, if not years, of "dead time." Such a possibility cannot but
have a chilling effect on the assertion of this constitutional right. It places
the accused under subtle but very real pressure to waive his right to trial
so that he might begin to serve his time. Such an effect should not be
permitted under our constitutional system. As was noted by the Supreme
Court in a case involving the issue of double jeojardy: "Penalizing those
who choose to exercise constitutional rights would be patently unconstitu-
tional.... And the very threat inherent in the existence of such a punitive
policy would... serve to chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights."4 5
C. Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy
In addition to its chilling effect on the right to trial, denial of sentence
credit may transgress the double jeopardy guarantee inherent in the fifth
amendment. Jail time-regardless of the name attached to it-is puni-
tive; and to deny credit is to subject an accused to more punishment for
a single offense than he would have had to endure otherwise. Given that
pretrial inzarceration might serve the very legitimate purpose of insuring
gain his freedom. .. .Yet in the case of an indigent defendant, the fixing of bail
in even a modest amount may have the practical effect of denying him release.....
Further reflection has led me to conclude that no man should be denied release because
of indigence.
43356 U.S. 363 (1958).
44 Meltsner, Pretrial Detention, Bail Pending Appeal, and jail Tim'e Credit: The Con-
stitutional Problems and Some Suggested Remedies, 3 CRiM. L. BULL. 618, 626 (1967).
45North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969).
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a defendant's presence at his trial, once that trial has taken place and
a conviction has resulted, no purpose seems to be served by not allowing
credit. The fact remains that the defendant has been deprived of his liber-
ty in connection with a crime for which he will now serve a sentence.
It is a fiction to maintain that this pretrial time has not been punishment,
especially in light of the conditions prevalent in jails.4 6 In speaking of
the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy in Pearce the Supreme
Court said:
We think it is clear that this basic constitutional guarantee is violated
when punishment already exacted for an offense is not fully "credited" in
imposing sentence for a new conviction for the same offense ... the same
principle obviously holds true whenever punishment already endured is
not fully subtracted from any new sentence imposed.47
Such language has obvious application to pretrail detention; it should mat-
ter little whether the punishment. occurred before or after conviction.
IV. A PRACTICAL PROBLEM
Admittedly, finding a guaranteed right to sentence credit raises difficult
problems. Perhaps the most immediate of these concerns the use of inde-
terminate sentencing, in which the trial judge has discretion-within the
parameters established by statute-to set the actual period of confine-
ment.48 In Williams the Supreme Court emphasized that its decision was
not meant to abridge a trial judge's discretion in setting sentence.49 Conse-
quently, it would be possible for a trial court to nullify a program of
sentence credit by simply increasing the defendant's sentence by the length
of pretrial incarceration. There is perhaps no effective way to safeguard
completely against this problem. However, there are procedures that
could be implemented to protect a defendant. In providing for federal
sentence credit, the Congressional Bail Reform Act of 1966 stated that:
"The Attorney General shall give any such person credit toward service
of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with the of-
fense or acts for which sentence was imposed . 8.0."5o This provision in
effect makes sentence crediting an administrative, not a judicial, act. Con-
sequently, the trial judge should be able to decide the length of a defen-
dant's sentence without any consideration of presentence time. Another
possible procedural safeguard could be drawn from the Supreme Court's
46 See Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 933 (1971)(Memorandum in which court detailed
the conditions in a particular county jail finding it, although especially bad, representative
of local jails in the United States).
47 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718 (1969).
48 In jurisdictions with determinate sentencing the trial judge would not have this discretion
and hence this would not be a problem.
49 Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).
50 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970).
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suggestion in North Carolina v. Pearce.5' In Pearce the Court was con-
cerned with a defendant who was given a much longer sentence upon
retrial after his first conviction had been set aside on appeal. In such
a situation, said the Court, a trial judge should be required to state explic-
itly the reasons for imposing the harsher term. There seems to be no
reason why such an articulation of the sentencing decision must be re-
stricted to the Pearce situation. Requiring it as a general practice would
perhaps lead to a more rational sentencing process, one in which pretrial
confinement was not a factor.
V. THE BAIL SYSTEM ITSELF
In general, courts have chosen to remain silent despite mounting docu-
mentation of the discriminatory effect upon indigents of requiring mone-
tary security in order to obtain pretrial release. That the state has a legiti-
mate and perhaps even compelling interest in assuring a defendant's pres-
ence at trial is indisputable. That it seeks to achieve this interest by using
a bail system based on wealth seems to distort the purpose of bail by
violating the very rights it was meant to guarantee: "the right not to be
punished before conviction and the right not to be prejudiced in preparing
for trial;"5 and even more basically, the right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty.
Bail, or alternately pretrial detention, plays a crucial part in each
defendant's case. Studies have shown that persons who must await trial
in jail are far more often convicted, far more often given a prison term
after conviction, and far more often given a longer sentence than those
who are free on bail.58 In Griffin the Supreme Court noted that studies
had demonstrated that a substantial portion of criminal convictions are
reversed on appeal.5 4 Given its importance to the outcome of a defendant's
case it was even more crucial, said the Court, that the appellate process
51395 U.S. 711 (1969).
5 2 Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: 1l, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1125, 1181
(1965).
53 Single, The Unconstitutional Administration of Bail: Bellamy v. Judges of New York
City, 8 CRiM. L. BULL. 459 (1972). Research studies have not yet shown conclusively why
this is so. The factors which lead to a verdict of guilty are for the most part elusive, oftentimes
defying attempts to set up causal relationships. However, some tentative conclusions are possible.
A jailed defendant loses the opportunity to participate effectively in his own defense. For
an accused who is part of a racial or social minority this right is especially valuable because
often he is better able to conduct an investigation in his community than his attorney. Further,
detention usually means loss of a defendant's employment which is perhaps the principal
reason he fares--poorly in the sentencing process, particularly in obtaining probation. It also
usually means he cannot afford a lawyer of his own choosing and must rely on one provided
by the state. Finally, there are the rather subtle prejudices that attach to a jailed defendant.
He must walk into court in prison garb between two guards rather than in his own suit
and tie at the side of his lawyer. His self-respect and presumption of innocence is perhaps
lessened in the eyes of the trial judge or jury.
" 351 U.S. at 18.
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not be arbitrarily denied to any accused. Since pretrial detention seems
to have a similar outcome-determinative impact, it would seem that pretrial
freedom should also not be arbitrarily denied. This is not to say that
the state has no right to confine some defendants prior to trial. It does
imply, however, that the criteria for such confinement should not be solely
financial. "A man is entitled to be released on 'personal recognizance'
where other relevant factors make it reasonable to believe that he will
comply with the orders of the Court."55 The term "relevant factors" refers
to a man's ties to his community; whether he has a family in !he commu-
nity; how long he has lived there; whether he has employment there. In
addition, it refers to a consideration of the man himself and his crime:
whether his release would jeopardize society; whether he would be likely
to commit another crime or to intimidate the witnesses to the crime with
which he is charged. All of these are indications of whether or not a
man would be a good risk for release. They avoid the anomalous situation
in which a poor-risk defendant with money can gain release while a good-
risk without means cannot. The application of the Griffin rule to the
bail system itself could lead to a more rational pretrial release system not
only for indigents but for all defendants.
VI. CONCLUSION
Though federal courts have traditionally been reluctant to interfere
with the sentencing process of state courts, a few such courts are beginning
to break this pattern of nonintervention. They have based their decisions on
the equal protection principles begun in Griffin and extended in such cases
as Williams and Tate. Some of the courts have recognized that the issue
of sentence credit leads into the more involved question of bail. Though
not directly confronting this question, they do seem to formulate their
sentence crediting decision so as to take a first step toward the application
of equal protection to the area of bail. Minimumly they have held that
sentence crediting is constitutionally mandated, at least for defendants de-
nied bail because of indigency. In addition they have suggested that pre,
trial detention, if not to assure an accused's appearance at trial, is unconsti-
tutional. Thus though the courts do not go so far as to declare unconsti-
tutional a monetary bail system, they do seek to remedy some of its most
adverse effects.
Suzanne K. Richards
5 5 Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Cr. 13.
